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   I. Referenda – hurdles to the process of European Integration? 
 
      1. Lessons from the recent national referenda  
 
The referenda which took place within some Member States of the European 
Union on the occasion of the ratification of European Treaties are not seldomly  
regarded as hurdles or troublemakers or obstacles to the process of European 
Integration. The Treaty of Maastricht from 1993, by which the European Union 
was founded and its first pillar, the European Community,  has been restructured 
to an Economic and Monetary Union was threatened to nearly failing during the 
process of its ratification within the 15 Member States because of the result of 
the referenda in France and in Ireland and above all because of the result of the 
referendum in Danmark. As far as France and Ireland were concerned, in both 
countries only a very short majority of the people approved the Treaty, in 
Danmark the people had to be asked for its consent a second time after a 
negative result of the first referendum. The Treaty of Nice has only been 
adopted in Ireland  after a second refrendum which had conrtrary to the first 
onde a positive result. The Treaty “establishing a Constitution for Europe”which 
had has been adopted nearly unanimously by the European Convention and, in 
accordance with this gas been approved by governments of all Member States 
did not get the consent of the French and the Dutch people. Both people were 
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involved in the rarification processe by referenda which were arranged in these 
two countries in accordance with their constitutional procedures governing the 
inclusion of European Treaties. As far as the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland, Sweden, Danmark, Poland and Tschechia are concerned, even 
European-minded optimists in these countries and in the European Union reckon 
on disapprovals by the people of each of these countries in the case that 
referenda on the said Constitution Treaty during the ratification processes should 
take place. 
 
This beeing so, the course of the European Integration process during the last 
decades very strongly gives advise to academic scholars as well as to politicians 
to reflect on the role and function and, above all, on a possible new 
constitutional placing of national referenda within the ratification procedure of 
European Treaties. Especially such reflexions seem to be necassary in the 
context of the highly urgent need to negotiate among the meanwhile counting 27 
Member States - as envisaged and dicussed - a minimised new European Treaty 
by which the said monstreous Treaty on an Constitution for Europe could and 
should be substituted. Without a new Treaty, as envisaged, minimised and 
properly dressed, which as heir of worthy work of the European Convention 
would have to be a getting out of the constitutional dilemmata and a 
breakthrough at any case, the failed Constotition Treaty could probably not be 
saved from totally being condamned and unpolitely being buried.
i 
 
Some  people occasionally classify or even blame national referenda which take 
place within Member States in accordance with their constitutional law as 
“hurdles” or as “troublemakers” or even as “obstacles” to the process of 
European Integration, especially in the case that they have negative results Thee 
people not seldomly are of the opinion that national referenda have to be 
contained or even to be completely eliminated. All these peope do not do 
enough justice to the referenda as institutions of public life being legitimated not 
only under national constitutional law but also under the constitutional law 
philosophy of the European Union.
ii  
 
Using such phraseology and blaming the referenda in the discribed way reveals 
ignorance of those people or even their disregard if not even disrespect vis-á-vis 
a basic democratic institution. The basic understanding of democracy is that 
public power emanates from the people and that the people as sovereign do not  
exclusively have to exercise its sovereignty by a group of elected delegates 
constituting the representative institution, called Parliament or National 
Assembly. The sovereign is not blocked by delegating its powers to its 
representation to exercise the sovereignty “on its own”. Directly acting in the 
sense that political issues are decided by simple acclamation or by the taking 
place of referenda is not a lower ranking principle of democracy, i.e. of the 
“governing of the people”. Therefore, as far as debates and discussions on the   3
role of referenda in the ratification processes of European Treaties are 
concerned, the decisive question is not whether the existing national referenda 
could and should be eliminated or at least restricted. Legitimated only is the 
asking for the feet on which referenda should be installed in the ratifiction 
processes and, above all, in which way they should reasonably be arranged and 
properly be placed. Should they be resonably and more adequately restructured 
and still be placed within the constitutional framework of the Member States or 
instead of this within the constitutional framework of the European Union and 
be arranged by the Member States under the supervision of the European 
Union´s organs. If politicians, for escaping out of the dilemma, should argue as 
they have done that one could and should go to the people and repeate the 
referenda as many times as necassary until the “right” answers are given they 
would not pay respect to the sovereign. Furthermore, “treatising” the people in  
such a unworthy way of handling the “affaire” -  by no means spleeny but an 
actual idea -  would simply ignore that arranging further referenda which are not 
completely redressed and restructured, i. e. consisting of the same questions and 
objects, arranged to the purpose of overruling “unwished” results of the “failing” 
of a former referendum are regarded as unconstitutional according either by 




    2.The monstrous dressing of the referenda as hurdles to their proper 
       functioning  
 
Instead of criticising referenda as hurdles, troublemakers or even as obstacles to 
the process of European Integration the eyes should be strictly put on the 
volume, the object, the content, and the dressing of all national referenda which 
uptl now toook place in the past during the various processes of the ratification 
of European Treaties. It  simply seems necessary to ask wether not the way  
referenda are traditionally arranged and dressed as far as their volume, content 
and object are concerned should be approached as the “villain”, i.e. the hurdle or 
the troublemaker or the outstanding obstacle to European integration. The 
number of problematic questions which the European Treaty on the constitution 
for Europe raises is far from being few and even more far from simply be 
solved. The complexity and the legislative implications of a Treaty like the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe can hardly be understood and 
descided by the people without broadly commentating article by article.  The 
complexity of the Constitution Treaty surmounts the compexity and implications 
of nearly every normal legislative undertaking. The Treaty contains nearly 200 
pages written text and consists of more than 400 hundred articles, it is, as its text 
is concerned, hardly readable and probabely non understandable although it is,  
for the people more important than any other proposal for legislation. The 
Treaty, using the description of its content as a Constitution for Europe,   4
aescription which normally refers to the fundamental law of a state, does not 
clarify that the European Union will not be establish as a “European Superstate”. 
A Treaty like the European Constitution Treaty simply is not suited for asking 
millions of men and women, living within 27 coubtries, speaking different 
languages and being embedded within different political cultures for their 
opinion. Under the given circumstances a clear and cut workable decision on 
whether this Treaty should be adopted as fundamental law of  the European 
Union cannot be considered and taken by the people, at least not under the 
conditions as they exist that  there are not enough facilities for an effective, i.e. 
an integrated political dispute shaped by an integrated European public opinion, 
especially no facilities enough  for the offsetting of opinions across the boarders 
within the European Union which would have to be administered by an 
integrated media and news paper systems as well as other institutions capable 
for shaping public opinion. Even experts who are trained in constitutional law 
and in European law are likely not generally capable to the complete 
understanding and to a correctly assessing of the implications of such a 
volumenous and complicated set of rules and norms which the Treaty on the 
Constitution for Europe consists of.   
 
Arranging referenda within the Member States in a way as described, has to take 
into account that not only Europe´s appropriate constitutional structure but its r 
developement as such, and above all the fate of Europe is at stake.  Therefore, an 
uncountable number of questions, which are interlocked one with the other in 
different ways, sinply cannot reasonably and responsibly be presented to the 
people for giving decisive answers. National or European referenda which are 
dressed in this way are sambling to games the outcome of which are always 
uncertain, they are anything else than a  reasonable contribution to the process of 
European integration. If for example, the question would have been presented to 
the French and the Dutch people for their approval of the proposed new 
prescription that the President of the European Commission should be elected in 
the future under the condition that European Parliament be more involved in 
than in the past such a reduced referendum would have probably had a positive 
result in both countries. The specific prescription has been incidently rejected in 
France and in the Netherlands by the total disapproval of the Treaty. It is worth 
to ask how many Frenchmen and Dutchmen at all have been aware of this 
special provision of the Treaty. The said prescription which has been incidently 
rejected does not only improve the procedure for the election of the President of 
the Commission but strengthens the democratic legitimation fo the European 
Commission as such.  
 
The primary concern to deal with is not the referendum as such but are the 
manner and the bulk the questions which are presented to the people to be 
decided by them.  It is necessary that the object, i.e. the questions of the 
referendum, have to be not too numerous and have to be absolutely   5
understandable to the common  man. For  properly fulfilling  its  function  the  
referendum  has  to  be dressed and structured in the way that the questions 
could serve as basis for reflections and discussions.  
 
The Governments and not the people are primarily responsible for 
constitutionalising Europe. The dressing of referenda in a way that the 
referenda fulfill their functions, is an important task of the governments in the 
context of properly constitutionalising Europe. Governments could be 
approached for any failure of manageing their task. They should be approached 
in the future if they do not correctly assess the decision capacity of their people 
and, especially, should be approached if their referenda are not structured in a 
way that the people could porperly and responseably exercise their role in the 
process of ratification of European Treaties. The Constitution Treaty, menwhile 
set aside is an example of a rarely readable and rarly understandable volume of 
articles, legal norms and rules, declarations and protocolls ans is not an example 
of a resonably structured object for a referendum. example,neither for a national 
refrendum nor for an European Refrendum. It should not have been presented to 





   II. Replacing the referenda as institution of democracy within the 
        processes of ratification of European Treaties 
 
Apart of the necessity to redress the referenda as described above it seems to be 
worthwhile to examine whether the existing national referendum as a democratic 
institution could be replaced or substituted within the processes of ratification of 
European Treaties.  
 
     1. Repealing national referenda  
 
It is not questionable that Member States could abstain from referenda by 
autonomous decisions if they want to facilitate the processes of ratification of 
European Treaties or if they want to prevent the eventual failing of European 
Treaties following from disapproval by their people. But the question is wether 
they can be obligated to do so by a legal act of the European Union. 
 
Member States whose constitutional law does not strictly prescribe a referendum 
in cases of European Treaties but gives discretional power to the President like 
in France or to the goverment or to Parliament to arrange a referendum do not 
have the same dfficulties to abstain from a referendum than those countries the 
constitutional law or a established custom of which, strictly provides for 
referenda. But, even in cases where referenda are not strictly prescribed public 
opinion and the political circumstances can constitute stringent guidelines and   6
instructions which might set boarders to the government, to the head of the state 
or to the goverment for an envisaged abstaining from a referendum.   
 
The abstention from referenda creates nearly unsurmountable difficulties in 
those countries in which the referenda are prescribed by constitutional law. In 
these states abstaining from referenda requires a formal change of the 
constitution which presupposes a long during and complicated political and 
legislative process. In these Member States any changing of the constitution for 
the said purpose would hardly be taken into consideration if among the people 
the rate of consent to the process of European integration is traditionally low or, 
as in Germany, has considerably decreased in the recent past. Critical situations 
are  more or less the case in nearly all Member States.  
 
Abstainig from national referenda on the basis of an obliging legal act of the 
European Union seems to be no solution. As far as the existing law of the 
European Union or, respectivly of the European Community is concerned  none 
of the organs of the European Union is authoriesed and, further more, not 
legitimated to adopt a legal act which obligates the Member States to abstain 
from referenda, if necassery by changing their constitutional law. The existing 
law of the European Union does not even include an authorisation and sufficient 
legitimation of the European Parliament, of the European Council or of the 
Commission to recommend the Member States the changing of their referenda 
legislation and practice.  The national constitutional law which way it might be 
shaped forms part of the national identity of the Member State which according 
to the law of the European Union has to be strictly respected by the European 
Union (article 6 EU-Treaty). National referenda reflect the principle of 
democracy which according to the law of the Euroepean Union has also to be 
strictly respected by the European Union. Respecting the principle of democracy 
is a condition for membership within the European Union for the countries 
admission and their further staying within the European Union. To make it clear, 
all special authorisations and competences to harmonise national law and 
legislation which actually are provided for by the constituional system of the 
European Union and its legal order, the prescriptions of the Treaty on a 
constitution for Europe included, do not authorise to harmonise national 
constutional law, even not in the case that the authorisations would be broadly 
and extensively interpreted. The articles 94 and 95 of the EC-Treaty which 
entitle the European legislator to harmonise national law for the purpose of 
creating and the proper functionning of the Common Market and article 308 EC-
Treaty (former article 235 EC-Treaty) which authorises the European Union to 
harmonise national legislation under special conditions cannot be applied.  
 
If the European Union should like to obligate the Member States to abstain from 
referenda in the ratification process on European Treaties a new authorisation 
for the adoption of such an appropriate legal act of harmonisation in this field of   7
national constitutional law would have to be created by altering the Treaty of 
Maastricht by a new Treaty to be concluded by the Member Staates. Such a  
Treaty the content of which would have been the creation of a special 
authorisation to harmonise national constitutional law for the purpose of 
abstaining from referenda had to be adopted by the national Parliaments and, 
respectively, by their second Chambers and had to be presented to the people for 
approval within those Member States in which referenda are provided for. 
Within these countries the people would probably not give their approval to a 
European Treaty changing the national constitution and depriving them from 
their right to approve or to disapprove European Treaties.  
 
     2. Arranging national referenda at the same date 
 
Arranging national referenda within the Member States concerned at the same 
date does not seem to be in discussion. But it is worthwhile not to abstain from 
reflecting on this idea. Here too, adopting a legal act by the European Union 
which would oblige the Member States concerned to arrange the agenda this 
way that they take plce on the same day would touch national constitional law 
and presuppose an authorisation of the European Unions´ legislator. The 
authorisation would have to be created before and this could only be done by 
altering the Treaty of Maastricht as prescribed before.  
 
The question is whether, at least, the European Union, could adopt a 
recommendation asking for national referenda at the same date under the 
existing European law. The prevailing theory of European Law says that the 
European Union can only adopt recommendations in fields in which it is 
authorised by a specil prescription to act either by policy measures or as 
legislator. A recommendation of the European Union that a referendum should 
take place on a special date, and this together with the taking pace of referenda 
in other Member States would evidently touch the right of the national 
governments based on the national constitution to freely choose the appropriate 
date. But Member States are obliged to refrain from any action which are 
running against the interests of the European Union 
iv or as the Treaty on the 
Constitution for Europe more precisely states they are even obliged “to facilitate 
the achievments of the European Union´s tasks and to refrain from any measure 
which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives”
v of the European law.  
 
Since the result of a national referendum, especially if it is a negative one, could 
influence in whatever way and in whatever direction the people in other 
countries where the referenda take place at later dates, arranging national 
referenda at the same dates clearly lies within the interests of the European 
Union. Elections or referenda within Member States which do not take place 
simultanously in all parts of their territory are regarded as hardly being in 
accordance with the principle of democracy and are not usual. The European   8
Union should be regarded as authorised by an unwritten authorisation of 
European law to recommend the Member State that in the European Union´s and 
their own interests their referenda have to take place at the same date. 
 
But one has to be aware  that the election to the European Parliament do not take 
place at the same date in all Member States, nontheless the possible “cataract 
and domino effect” of this proceedings.  
 
    3. The European Referendum 
 
The arrangement of a so-called European Referendum would comply with the 
principle of democracy and would make national referenda as superfluous. Due 
to the possible abandonment of national referenda the European Referendum is 
the most dicussed idea and proposal in the context of replacing and restructuring 
the national referenda in a way that the process of European integration is not 
harmed more than necessary. 
 
Theoretically, two different structures of organising the European Referendum 
are thinkable. The referendum could be structured this way that the votes of the 
European citizens are counted seperately in each Member State and that the 
result of the national voting within each Member State is decisive which means 
that a majority of the people in all Member States would have to approve the 
European Treaty (national counting system). This structure of the referendum 
would extend the referenda which are taken place in some Member States to all 
the other Member States. Whether the “national counting system” would 
facilitate European integration even if the referenda would take place at the 
same date is highly questionable. But the idea “Europe for the Citizens” would 
certainly be honoured and be strengthened. Secondly, the referendum could be 
organised this way  that regardless the voting by the people in the Member 
States the votes of the European citizens are counted within the European Union 
across thenational borders and the union wide counted voting alone would be 
decisive for the appoval of the European Treaty (unified union wide counting 
system). 
 
In the first case the voting proecedure on the level of the people and the voting 
procedure on the Parliamentary level do not raise questions. Since the people of 
all Member States would have to agree the normal and usual procedure of the 
voting via referenda could and should be applied, namely that the majority of the 
votes are decisive (simple majority). On the Parliamentary level the question 
whether unanimity or a two third majority should be decisive does not arrive. 
Since the electorates of all Member States would have to give their approval the 
national Parliaments would also have to give their approval by unanimity. Since 
Parliaments respect the vote of their electorates the voting results by their people   9
whether they are approving or disapproving the European Treaty need not to be 
binding to Parliaments. 
 
The second type of a European Referendum, i.e. the referendum which is 
institutionalised the way that the votes of the European Citizens are counted 
across the national borders raises questions and creates implications which are 
crucial. An answer has firstly to be given to the question whether the  - simple -  
majority of the votes of the European Citicenry or a qualified majority, i.e. a two 
third majority of the votes should govern the voting procedure. Than the by far 
most crucial question nessessitates an answer whether on the Parliamentary level 
unanimity should be reqired for the adoption of the European Treaty or whether 
two thirds of the national Parliaments – the second chambers included – would 
be sufficient for its adoption.   
 
The voting procedure on the level of the citizens evidently creates a problem  
because of the different growth of the population of the Member States. Even 
the “qualified majority solution”, but more the “ simple majority solution” 
would not exclude the feeling of the people of the less larger and smaller 
Member States, that they might be “governed” by the people of the larger 
Member States. Since the new 12 Member States mostly are less larger and 
smaller Member States the vote of the people of the older Mamber States would 
be decisive in most of the cases.  
Probabely all Member States would have a preference for the qualified majority 
voting solution. This solution would be absolute necessity in the case that on the 
Parliamentary level not unanimity but a two third majority desion would be 
sufficient for the setting into force of the European Treaties. In deed, the 
decisive question which this type of a European Referendum raises is wether on 
the Parlamentary level unanimity as the actual rule of  procedure should persist 
or whether already a two third majority vote -  a sinple majority vote is 
absolutely out of question – should be sufficient for the approval of an European 
Treaty. 
 
Traditionally, majority ruling is far from governing the process of setting 
European Treaties into force. According to European law European Treaties   
have to be approved and ratified by the Parliaments - in additon by existing 
second chambers -  of all Member States. The requirement of unanimity might 
not correspond to the national procedure as povided for in the case of changing 
national constitutions but it would be in accordance with the constitutional law 
as it exists within th European Union. The reqirement of unanimity on the 
parliamentary level would certainly not faciltate the process of integration. 
Parliaments which would not be backed by the votes of their population would 
feel be bound by the opinion of its electorates and would probably hesitate to 
give their approval to an European Treaty even more than they did in the past. If 
the people in Germany where for the time being referenda do not take place   10
would not approve an European Treaty the Bundestag and the Bundesrat would 
pobably pay full respect to the opinion of the people and would not overrule its 
disapproval. All those, politicians and scholars, who are favouring European 
referenda argue that a European referendum would not make any real sense if 
the existing ruling procedure on the Parliamentary level would not be changed 
and the requirement of unanimity would not be abandoned in favour of a two 
third majority solution. Instead of facilitating the process of Europen integration 
one should not put further burden it. 
 
But transgressing to the two third majority solution, as charming and wishfull it 
may be, a clear answer has to givven to the question whether those Member 
States which were overruled should be bound to the decision possibly and are 
probably suffering from the feeling that they are now “forced Members” of the 
European Union or whether they should have the right to withdraw from their 
membership of or even be forced to leave the the European Union. For the time 
being Europen law does provide neither for the withdrawal from Membership 
nor for a forced expulsion in cases where Member States are overruled in 
normal legislative processes of the European Union. All deliberations going into 
the direction of an exemption for the process of constitutionalising Europe do 
not sufficiently take into account the basic aims and the philosophy which 
underlines the process of European integration. This process guaranteeing 
freedom, security and growing wealth, aims at the irrevocational inclusion of all 
European national states and the further staying of them within the European 
Union. The European Union ist not constitutionalised comparable to classical 
international organisations the statutes of which provide for free withdrawal at 
any time. From a material point of view unanimity is the basic ruling procedure 
within the European Union. The majority ruling has to step back in cases in 
which its so-called external costs overclimb the inner costs and benefits of a 
decision. The expulsion of a Member State who has been overruled or the 
withdrawel from membership are regarded as external costs  and would exceed 
the benefit of a legislative measure or of a European Treaty being a more or less 
substantial step towards European integration. The European Union would 
collapse if the overruling of Member States and their voluntary or forced 
withdrawal from membership would become normalcy.Therefore, the two third 




       a. The necessary authorisation for arranging European Referenda 
 
A European Referendum which should be arranged by the European Union 
requires that the European Parliament and the Council as common legislator of 
the European Union are authorised to adopt a legal act which obligates thr 
Member States to organise referenda. The necessary authorisation of the 
European Parliament and the  Council cannot be deduced from the present legal 
and constitutional order of the European Union. It would have to be introduced   11
into the legal and constitutional order of the European Union by changing the 
Treaty of Maastrich in its version of the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. The 
nessesary amendment to the Treaty of Maastricht would have to be arranged 
before the start of any legislative activity of the European Commission, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council.  
 
This being so, the European Referendum presupposes that the Member States 
have to initiate a European Treaty which simply has as its content the recreation 
of the needed authorisation of the European legislator to arrange Euroepan 
referenda and the obligation of the Member States to abstain from their 
tradtitional national referenda. Since unanimity among the Member States is a 
riquirement for negotiating and adopting European Treaties it would be a 
requirement in the case of the “Authorisation Treaty”, too. If the Member States 
should reach unanimity on a “Authorisation Treaty” which probably would not 
be an easy undertaking all national Parliaments - and the second chambers  - 
would have to give their consent to the authorisation in question  as well as to 
the elimination of national referenda. In those Member States in which the 
ratification of European Treaties require a referendum the creation of an 
authorisation of the European Parliament and the Council to arrange a European 
Referendum and to obligate Member States to abstain from their tradtional   
national referenda the people have to be asked for their approval of the Treaty. 
People would have to consent that the traditional national referendum will   
disappear and that they will be deprived of an existing right without having  the 
absolute assurance that the European Union would compensate their loss by 
granting equal possibilities of taking part in the process of constitutionalising 
Europe.  
 
During the negotiations on the “Authorisation Treaty” probably all basic 
questions which have been elaborated, the necessary “dressing” of the referenda 
included, would have to be discussed and would have to be solved by the 
governments of the Member States by unanimity. Without giving detailled 
instructions and guidelines to the European legislator for the dressing of a 
European Referendum the national governments, especially those in the 
countries of which like in France, in the Netherlands, in the UK and in some 
other countries referenda in the context of European Treaties take place, would 
hardly be willing to give the envisaged authorisation to the European legislator. 
 
The most crucial aspect of constitutionalising Europe the way, that a European 
referendum takes place, namely the different weight of the population of the 
larger Member States in relation to the weight of the less larger or even smaller  
Member States would probably be the main iussue of dispute if not even cause 
for the failing of the conference. The less larger and the smaller Member States 
would probably not accept that the results of the voting within the larger 
Member States, under certain constellations, could be decisive or at least of   12
relativ greater importance for the adoption or the rejection of European Treaties 
than the voices of their people. The less larger Member States and the smaller 
Member States would certainly stress the solution that all national Parliaments 
would have to approve the European Treaty if they would not even make their 





    b. The partially changing of the present basically confederal structure of 
    the Europen Union into a partially more federal structure - “nation 
    building aspect” -  by a European Referendum organised according to 
    the principle of unifiedcounting of the votes of the European Citizens and 
    the principle of counting the Member States`parlamentary  voting on the 
    basis of qualified majority (system of double or duplicate majority)                                
 
 
The European Referendum, if it is organised according to the pinciple of union-
wide counting of the votes of the people, raises a further aspect and a 
constitutional problem which uptil now does not seem to be sufficiently seen, at 
least not enough discussed. The said aspect being primaryly of academic interest 
could work as powder pleg when the European Referndum of the described type 
should become the iussue of a controversal political discussion among the 
Member States.  
 
Despite of its complexity, this aspect can be shortly described: A European 
Referendum, structured by union wide counting of the voting, simply implies 
that the 27 nations of the European Union are bound together in a way that they 
are regarded as an integrated European people or an integrated European 
citizenry. As such the 27 national citizenry or nations, unlike as in all other 
cases, are functionning like an integrated European Nation or an integrated 
European Citizenry, i.e. as an institution which is not provided for by the 
constitutional system of the European Union. The fictitiously setting up of a 
“European Nation” or of a “European Citizenry” or a “European Electorate” can 
hardly be brought in complyance with the prevailing philosophy of 
constitutionalising Europe and the status of actual deliberations on progressing 
towards the end of Europe´s unification process. The European Referendum of 
the type in question has a “nation building aspect” since it implies that a simple 
or qualified majority of the citizens of all Member States, artificially being 
bound together and constitutionalised as an integrated European Citizenry has to 
approve or disapprove a European Treaty i.e. has to make a binding decision as 
one of several partners of the process of constitutionalising the European Union. 
The fictitious European Citizenry is not only authorised to take part on the 
process of constitutionalising Europe but makes its decisions which decisivly   13
contribute to the constitutionalisation of Europe, regardless of the nationality of 
their members, on the basis of equal voting rights,  
 
Restructuring the people of the Member States of the Europen Union in the way 
that they build up an integrated “European Nation” or a “European Citizenry” or 
at least, like the Swiss people, build up a “community of common will and fate” 
might be a theoretical vision but means subordination of the actual 27 national 
citizenries being the sovereigns of the European Union to an suparnationally 
structured European institution. Besides this, equal rights of voting cannot be 
deduced from the constitutional law and from the prevailing philosophy of 
constitutionalising Europe. The two idealistic structural elements are deduced 
from the constitution and structure of a federal typed central state and do not fit 
into the constitutional system and theory of  the European Union. In times they 
habe been in discussions these two structural elements have been regarded as an 
utopian vision and have always been proved as inacceptable to the Member 
States.  
 
Under the constitutional system national citizens as “European citizens” do not 
have equal voting rights. About this, a European Citizenry based on the principle 
of equal voting rights and artificially created – a European Nation is out of 
question – would properly not function as “supreme sovereign” if not before the 
political and the societal system of the European Union would have been   
basically reversed and properly restructured.  
 
In the case of elections for the European Parliament the deputies of which are 
directly elected since 1979 equal voting rights of the European Citizens are not 
provided for. Equal voting rights does not mean that the election take place in all 
Member States according to the same procedure of voting but means that the 
Members of European Parliament are elected according to the principle “one 
man  - one vote”. As well known, the seats in the European Parliament are 
apportioned to the Member States and this in a way that although the larger 
Member States have more Parlamentarians than the smaller Member States the 
latter are over represented of the sizee of their electorates. The consequence of 
this is that the basic democratic principle of equal right of voting in the sense 
that every men´s vote has equal value in counting is not guaranteed in the 
European Union – at least not as far the election to Europen Parliament is 
concerned. Equal rights of voting cannot be granted by the European 
constitutional legislator to the people as long as the existing system of 
proportioning the number of seats has not been abandoned. Even under the 
Treaty on the Constitution for Europe the votes of electors in the larger Member 
States would count for considerably less than those of electors in the smaller 
Member States. Depending on where Union citizens choose to reside, they could 
increase the weight of their vote by two, three or maybe even eleven times 
   14
The Members of the European Parliament are according to the special 
disribution of their seats elected by the national people, not by a single European 
people in the sense that the national people are brought and bound together 
within the European Union, The on the basis of national elections elected 
Members of the European Parliament are representatives of the national 
people.
viii They are not representatives of a -  non existing and non thinkable  - 
“European Nation” or of an “European Citizenry” or of a “community of men 
and women having a common will and destiny”. The European Parliament may 
appear to represent a genuine authority but in terms of its structure, the 
European Parliament more or less reflects the confederal nature of the European 
Union and, respectivly of the European Community as an association of states. 
The European Parliament as the Europen Union as such does not exercise rights 
and competences the authorisation of which derives from a single electorate as 
the souvereign. Its authority derives from the Member States and their various 
electorates in terms of both its origin and its legitimation. The legal entities 
bearing responsibility for the European Unions´s and the European Community's 
competences and authority are the Member States. The citizens of the European 
Union do not enjoy protection from the European Union nor do they owe it 
substantial obedience. The Member States are ultimately accountable to the 
people for all decisions and acts that emanate from the European Union.  
 
If the European Union should derive its authority from the European citizenry, 
the European Union itself would have to be restructured from a confederation to 
a federation and as a first step before, the European Parliament staying within 
the center of the constitutional sytem and representing the citizenry would have 
to be reorganised and restructured as a represenentation of the European 
Cittzenry on the basis of equal voting rights. 
 
The lack of voting equality is due to the fact that the European Parliament, in 
origin, has been an assembly of representatives of - equal - Member States. Like 
the constitution of the European Union itself the structure of the European 
Paliament is still - to a less extent -  based on the principle in international law 
that each state in an association or conferation has an equal right to share in the 
exercise of their common sovereignty. The "Parliament"  of such an association 
does not have to abide by the principle that each citizen should share equally in 
the exercise of that sovereignty. The constitutional principle that all citizens 
should take an equal part in the exercise of state authority is the essential 
foundation of a federal union, but not necessarily of a confederal union of states. 
 
There are no signs and indications that in the future, at least in the near future, 
the European Union would be restructured from an confederation to a real 
federation, from “United Nations of Europe” to “United Europe”. Member 
States are evidently not willing to transfer more sovereignty to the European 
Union than they did in the past. Amomg other reasens they have the feeling that   15
a federalised Europe as a federally structured central state would degrate and 
considerably subordinate them as Member States to subordinated organisations. 
And there are no indications and signs to assume that the European Parliament 




There are other substantial reasons that the creation of a federally typed 
European State within which decisions are taken by a Parliament elected by an 
European Citizenry on the basis of equel voting rights is not a realistic vision. 
The parliamentary system of a European Union restructured as described would 
probably not function as well as expected and in way the national üarlamentary 
systems do. The European Union itself would likely not be governable under a 
parliamentary system. Its failing would partly be due to the fact that despite of 
the existence of a newly created “European Citicenry” a federalised European 
Union will continue to consist of separate nations even if they were 
theorethically and legally “subordinated” to the “European Citizenry”  for a long 
time to come.  A  properly functioning parliamentary system requires much 
more than just the formal restructuration of the European Parliament into a 
representation of the European Citizenry as the new sovereign, especially reqires 
much mor than the introduction of voting equality. For the well and adequately 
fonctioning of a parliamentary system at the level of the European Union some 
kind of centralised political filtering system to serve as an infrastructure of the 
parliamentary system would have to be in existence as a precondition. With 
regard to the size of  the European Union, this political filtering system would 
have to be highly centralised. For the effectivly operating of this system, beneath 
the European Parliament, an institutional framework would have to be 
established on the level of the society, centrally sstructued, to weigh up and 
balance all communications relevant to policy in a proper and efficient manner. 
This new famework would have to replace the existing national communications 
frameworks which are encrusted in national attitudes, and for the time being 
probably would have different influences on the European developement. The 
key players in shaping public opinion, in particular the mass media, would have 
to be organised and, above all, would have to operate along central lines. All 
these preconditions would generate a centralised political culture oriented 
towards the European Parliament. A properly functioning parliamentary system 
therefore implies to some extent a rejection of the call for multiculturalism and 
regionalism in the European Union. The European Union would have to 
reconsider the demand for multiculturalism and regionalism in the context of 
extending the role of the European Parliament to that of a genuine representation 
of the citizens of the European Union. 
  
The functional prerequisites for a European parliamentary system of government 
cannot be imposed by a fiat of the European Union. They can only develop of 
their own accord as the result of a process of social and political integration. The   16
task of the European Union, however,would be to remove the obstacles and 
barriers to their emergence, in particular to the growth of an integrated filtering 
system in the shape of political parties and social groupings. 
 
 
Under the exisiting constitutional law of the European Union, i.e. the Treaties of 
Rome and Maastricht in the version of the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, the 
basic polical aim of the European Union is the creation of an “ever closer 
Union” of its Member States and of their people, but not to unify the Member 
States and their people. The European constitutional law, and so does the Treaty 
on the Constitution for Europe, very clearly abstains from a more far reaching 
aim, ie.e. the settinp up of an federalised central European State.
x 
 
Unifying the citizens of the Member States to an “European Citizenry” as the 
European Referendum of the discussed type does and endowing this fictitious 
“Europen Citizenry” with the power to make binding decisions is not only not in 
complyance with the constitutional system of the European Union but even 
overreaches the aim of the integration process as far as its aims are consented 
among all Member States.
xi  
    
The assessment might be anotherone in the case of an European Referendum 
which is organised on the principle that the votes of the European Citizen are not 
counted union-wide but on the national basis.  A  European Referendum which 
is structured this way respects the structure of the constitutional and the societal 
situation as they are existing and could be brought in complyance with the aim 
of th European Union. 
 
     III. Final remarks 
 
As far as forseeable European Referenda on European Treaties, typed in the way 
that the votes of the cititizens are counted within the national frameworks might 
be consistent with the aims of the European Union and its connstitutional system 
but would only extent the national referenda practised in some countries to all of 
them,  it would by no means facilitate neither the process of ratification of 
European Treaties nor of the European integation process as such.  
 
As far as the federal type of a European Referendum is concerned, considerable 
doubts are justified whether their setting up would be accepted by the Member 
States, not because of their constitutional inplications, but simply by political 
reasons. This type of an European Referendum would surely not be acceptable 
to all Member States if it should provide for the double vote in that way, that the 
approval on the national parliamentary level does not require unanimty but a two 
third majority might be sufficient for approval.  
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Those who would be involved in the process of negotiating as politicians or their 
advisors would be very soon aware of a “substantial disparity” which would rule 
the elections if the referendum would be introduced within the voting systems in 
the case of a European Treaty. They could convincingly argue that in the process 
of approving the European Treaties people participate by voting according to the 
principle of equal voting rights whereas in the forgoing process of shaping the 
European Treaty, which are much more important than the latter and which 
indirectly implies the participation of the people, the said principle be not 
applied. A qualified majority of the people can approve a European Treaty 
which when being shaped has been indirecty disapproved by their majority. For 
the time being the European Parliament is only involved in the process of 
shaping a European Treaty this way that it is consulted, but probably in the 
future as proposed and foreseen within the Treaty of a Constitution for Europe 
by its consent. Its members are not elected on the basis of equal rights the 
consequence of which means dfferent participation of the European Citizens in 
this process. As far as the negitiating and adopting of the Treaty by the national 
governments is concerned, the status of indirect participation of the people is 
strongly different, too. The picture of non coherency and of a schizophrenic 
participation system  might become the basic arguement not to accept the federal 
typed European Referendum and by doing so to reject a new possible 
breakthrough of the European integration process. 
 
The requirement of unanimity on the parliamental level instead of the crucial 
requirement of a two third majority does not facilitate the process neither of the 
raticification of Europan Treaties nor of the European integation process as 
such. This type of a European Referendum would probably not be acceptable to 
those Member States and their people who are more in favour of the 
strengthening of European integration and are favouring steps towards “United 
Europe” whenever such steps are possible.  
 
In the near future, not European Referenda will govern the scene but the national 
referenda will prevail. But the national referendum, as far as its structuring and 
the putting of questions is concerned has to be redressed in a way that it 
functions in accordance with its philosophy. Clear and cut formulated questions 
which are understandably at least for a big majority of the people have to be 
presented, they should not be interlocked in a confusing way and their number 
has to be limited. This new dressing of the national referendum should be 
regarded as a stringent obligation of the Member States´ governments. If the 
process of intergration of Europe, as it has been the case in the past, should no 
even become more burdened and suffering from a deceasing rate of consent of 
the people within nearly all Member States and the referenda should not be 
restructured as proposed not only the European Treaty as the basic instrument of 
the gradual  progression of Europe´s integration but Europe´s integation as such 
would be at stake, if not even be jeorpardised. The national governments, the   18
organs of the European Union and all the other institutions like the conventions 
and like the media participating in the process of Europe´s building up are faced 
with the described task resulting from the dilemmata which the national 
referenda have created in their traditional dressing. If they would not assume 
responsibility and succeed in solving the dilemmata they would be responsible 
for and could be blamed for a further stagnation of the process of European 
integration if not even of its slowing down. Correctly organised, referenda are 
not hurdles, troublemakers or obstacles to the process of European integration 
but are contributing to its legitimation and acceptance among the European 
Citizenry.   19
 
Footnotes:  
                                                 
i During the  processes  of ratification of all the former European Treaties (Paris, Rome and Luxembourg) 
national referenda did not take place and obviously needed not taking place in the Member States. European 
Treaties at that time were evidently regarded as normal International Treaties without direct implications for the 
people. Therefore, governments, more or less could “dictate”  the Treaties to their people and did so.  
  
ii The European Union, as created by the Treaty of Maastricht, is not a legal entity. It consists of three „pillars“ 
or bases, the first pillar being the former three meanwhile two European Communities - i.e. the European 
Community (former European Economic Economic), Community and the European Community on Atomic 
Energy and – in the past – the Europenan Community on Coal and Steel, the second pillar described as the 
cooperation among Member States in foreign and security policy and, the third pillar named as the cooperation 
among Member States in domestic and judicial affairs. 
 
Among the three pillars the European Community is a legal entity. It has its own constitutional order but does 
not share its legal and constituiotnal order with the two other “pillars”. As far as the second and the third 
mainstays are concerned the European Union, as such and a whole, basically being an association of states or a 
confederation, even is no more than an intergovernmental procedure for cooperation among Member States, and 
for cooperation between the Member States. Member States have not transferred as they did within the sphere of 
the Common Market and the Economic and Monetary Union and within further fields, their foreign and security 
policy to the European Union, but only agreed to co-operate in this field within the framework of the European 
Union.  
 
Any transfer of competences in the future to the European Union in the field of foreign and security policy, or in 
the field of justice and home affairs, requires a new agreement to be adopted by the Member States and its 
ratification according to nationalconstitutional law. This has partially happened at the conference of Amsterdam 
in 1997. Acording to the Treaty of Masstricht the European Union has a "single institutional framework“, but as 
far as the second and the third pillars are concerned the European Union being no more than an 
intergovernmental procedure for cooperation among Member States, and for cooperation between the Member 
States, does not equally function as within the European Community, especially not as far as its  competences to 
give impulses is concerned. 
 
By its very structure, even the European (Economic) Community is an association of states, i.e.a confederation, 
and this regardless of its conversion into an Economic and Monetary Union, which is associated with a surrender 
by the Member States of their monetary policy sovereignty to the Community. Insofar as the European 
Community exercises authority on the basis of the sovereign rights transferred to it, this authority is derived from 
the Member States in terms of both its origin and its legitimation. The legal entities bearing responsibility for the 
Community's authority are the Member States; the citizens of the European Community do not enjoy any 
substantial protection from the European Community nor do they owe it substantial obedience. It is to them that 
the Member States are ultimately accountable for all decisions and acts that emanate from the European Union. 
  
This structure of the European Comminity is mainly reflected in the fact that the power to legislate in the Community 
remains in the hands of the Council of Ministers, where the Member States are represented by members of their governments. 
The European Parliament's part in the legislative and political decision-making process is confined to the right to co-decide 
with the Council (Article 251 of the EC Treaty) although, in specific fields of action, the European Parliament has a right of 
approval.  
 
The Community's character as a confederation is also evidenced by the fact that the limiting effects of the basic 
rights and freedoms under Community law, as recognised in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, 
are confined to Community sovereignty alone. These basic rights and freedoms are binding on the Member 
States only where they act to apply or implement Community law. Where the Member States exercise their own 
residual sovereignty to act, those basic rights and freedoms have no limiting effect. Firms and private individuals 
who are affected by a national measure falling outside Community sovereignty can only rely on the protection 
afforded by the Member State in question. Where such protected basic rights and interests are affected by 
national measures, such as expropriation, they cannot take their case to a Community authority such as the Court 
of Justice. The limited scope of the fundamental rights afforded by the Community legal order are, then, a clear 
indication of the confederal rather than federal nature of the Community constitutional order.The European 
Community does, in fact, possess some supranational features. Decision-making by qualified majority in the 
Council, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, the authority given to the Commission to monitor and control   20
                                                                                                                                                         
Member States´ aids and enforce competition law as well as the precedence of Community law over national law 
are all evidence of a pre-eminence of the Community over its Member States. Article 48 EU Treaty, however, 
gives constitution-making power solely to the Member States. The Commission has no right of proposal under 
the procedure for amending the Treaty, nor does amendment of the Treaty require the approval of the European 
Parliament. Exercise of the powers assigned to the Community requires the participation of the Member States in 
two ways. Firstly, it is through the Member States, or more precisely via their Parliaments, that the exercise of 
Community competence is given democratic legitimacy. Secondly, the Community depends on the Member 
States for the political and legal implementation of the policies entrusted to it. 
 
In the European Parliament the European Union seemes to posses an institution which represent a genuine 
Community authority. In terms of its organisation, however, European  Parliament, too, reflects the confederal 
structure of the Community as an association of states. Unlike a national parliament, the European Parliament is 
nota  representative of a European "nation", of a “European Citicenry, or of a community of common will and 
destiny, i. e.. of the national peoples taken as a single electorate or of all European citizens. By its basic structure 
and in the terms of the legal definition (Article 189 of the EC Treaty), the European Parliament represents the 
peoples of States brought together in the Community, despite of the direct election of its Members. 
 
Transforming the European Union from a union of states to a federally structured state was not one of the aims 
of the Maastricht conference. Under the Treaty of Maastricht the constitution and institutional structure of the 
European Community, as laid down in the Treaty of Rome, remain unchanged. The European Parliament has 
neither gained a new position nor has the protection afforded to fundamental rights in the European Union been 
recast accordingly. There was a consensus among those taking part in the conference that the fundamental 
structure of the European Community should remain unchanged, notwithstanding the new powers assigned to it, 
in particular the transfer to the Community of powers in the monetary field. This consensus was reflected above 
all in the fact that the extension of the powers of the European Parliament was not a major priority aim for the 
conference. The thinking of the Member States went no further than to allow the European Parliament an 
increased role in the legislative process. The new "co-decision procedure", which applies in several areas, does 
not affect the decision-making powers of the Council as the real authority exercising Community legislative 
power. To counterbalance the reduction in the powers of the national parliaments through the transfer of new 
powers to the Community, the Member States - in a joint declaration, adopted as part of the Final Act of the 
Treaty of Maastricht - called on the European Parliament and the national parliaments to meet jointly in a 
"Conference of Parliaments" (Assizes) for the purpose of consultation and reporting. This declaration clearly 
shows that the Member States regard the legitimation for Community legislation and policy-making as stemming 
primarily from the national parliaments rather than from the European Parliament.  
 
As a "community of states", the European Union can only take over new tasks and functions to a limited extent. 
Some tasks and functions of the state necessarily require the organisational structure of a federally structured 
state for their effective exercise and formulation. Political debate in the European Eunion is shaped by the fact 
that some extensive tasks of the state are due to be transferred to the European Union, while there is no intention 
that it should abandon its basic structure as a community of states; so far, a "United Europe" is not a generally 
acceptable goal; the concept of a "United Nations of Europe" reflects the present structure of the European 
Union. If the European Union is to be given powers that can only be exercised on the basis of a genuine state 
structure, the European Union must first be transformed into a federal-style state. The Treaty “establishing a 
constitution for Europe”, if carefully read and analysed pays full respecct to thse constitutional reflexions and 
philosophy. 
 
iii This hard judgement ist the more justified as the innovative content of the Treaty on the Constitution for 
Europe is rather limited in relation to the already existing Europen constitutional law.  An approval by the 
people probably could have been reached in the case that only the small but important bulk of new innovative 
constutitional norms would have been the content of the referenda i.e. would have been fixed together, properly 
commented and dressed in an understandable way and presented to the people. Of course, this set of few norms 
and rules could not have been namend and called as “constitution”. But, the Treaty in question does not contain 
a “constitution”, at least not a constitution for a European State, even not for a federal typed one.  It only 
contains sinmilar to the present “constitutional” outfit of the European Union, a statute or a charter for the 
European Union as a confederation of states,  of cause endowed with some supranational features.  From a 
material point of view, the Treaty has no further intention than to sinply modify and alter some features of the 
existing organistional  structure of the European Union.  Admitted, the existing European Union is not a legal 
entity but would become one under the governance of  the Constitution Traety. Admitted, the European Union 
consists of three independent “pillars” or “columns” and would loose its famous three-temple-structure under   21
                                                                                                                                                         
the governance of the proposed Constitution, in deed. The basic norms Union as contained in the Treaties of 
Rome, Luxembourg, Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice, which are constitutionalising  the European Union - 
from a legal point of view being already the “statute” of the European Union if not even the best and most 
efficient one -  according to the opinion of the European Court of Justic they even perform a “constitution” of 
the European Uninion. As far as the concept of the constitution as proposed by the Constitution Treaty is 
concerned, it is anything else than a complete new one, the concept has as its guidelines and orientation the 
existing statute  and the exsisting constitutional structure of the European Union of Maastricht. It does not at all 
restructure the European Union from a confederation of states into a federation which its wrong description as 
“constitution” might indicate for the people. The intention of the Treaty could have been conceived this way 
that it restricts itself to a limited number of new articles deemed necessary for improving the existing statute or 
“constitution” of the European Union. Corresponding to its basic content being a simple amendment to the 
existing statute of th European Union it could not have been called “constitution” in this case. By founding the 
European Union as a complete new entity and by intending to establish a complete new consitution the Treaty 
could not have simply be restricted to the new norms and prescriptions and referred to the main part of already 
existing constitutional presciptions, it had to pick up the complete unchanged main bulk of unchanged primary 
law consisting of hundreds of articles - the protocolls which are annexed to the Treaty of Rome, Maastricht, 
Amsterdam and Nice being part of primary law, included. The including was nessary according to the special 
idea of the convention as well as of the conference of the national goverments, that the European Union should 
newly be founded and should not be identical with the European Union of Maastricht.  For an idea which might 
be responsable for the outcome of the referenda in France and in the Netherlands the total bulk of the 
unchanged European constitutional has been presented to the European people as law of the Europen Union for 
approval although it already existed. Since the biggest part of the European people are laymen or laywomen, by 
concveiving and implementing this ”idialistic” plan, a potential wrong understanding of the real situation could 
not have be excluded,  and the understanding of the people that all parts of the “constitution” are absolutely new 
ones and have to be approved has been foreseeable, more or less.  
 
As far as the fate of the envisaged following up Treaty is concerned it should be primarily kept in mind that the 
failing Constitution Treaty alters the existing organisational structure of the European Union desively by only 
some but very important new norms, rules and prescriptions. All norms, rules and prescriptions which outreach 
these relative little bulk of neccessary changes of the existing constitutional statute of the European Union 
would remain valid law and would not need a second appoval by the people under the condition that the 
“heroic” concept of newly refounding the European Union would be abandoned.  As a comsequence of the 
abandoning of this concept, for the people totally non understandable, the inclusion of the huge bulk of 
unchanged European law would be abandonable. The concept of refounding the European Union as a new one 
seems to be questionable and not convincing, since, nontheless of the refounding of the European Union, 
according to the Constitution Treaty, the whole bulk of secondary European law, especially the secondary law 
of the European Community and the whole bulk of jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and of the 
Court of first Instance had to remain valid as law and jurisdiction of the newly founded European Union.  
 
Although beeing new ones some of the new presciptions of the Constitution Treaty need not necessarily be 
ratified by the Member States. They could be set into force by simply exercising internal authorisations 
provided for by the established law or even by making not binding decisions on behalf  of the European Union.. 
There exclusion from the ratification process within the Member States would have as consequence that these 
prescriptions would not have to be renegotiated among Member States on the incomming new 
intergovernmental conference and that  27 national Parliaments and even in some countries the people would 
not habe to be asked for their approval. For example, the Euro is already the legal tender and the currency of the 
European Union and need not be introduced again into the law system of the European Union by an European 
Treaty. Ludwig van Beethoven´s “Ode to the Joy” from the Ninth Symphony seems to be complety accepted as 
the anthem of the European Union and need not be prescribed as anthem to the European people by a European 
Treaty as the Constitution Treaty does. The same is due to May 9
th as celebration and Europe Day the 
prescription of which could be effectively anchored within the constitutional system of the European Union by 
a common resolution of European Parliament and the European Council on a proposel from the European 
Commission instead of putting them into the new Treaty with the consequence that it has to be ratified by 27 
national parliaments and in some countries the people would have to give their formal consent. 
 
iv See Article 11 EU Treaty  
 
v See Article I-5 Constitution Treaty  
   22
                                                                                                                                                         
vi Even in other cases, the highly beseeched principle of majority voting has to be given up in favour of the 
principle of voting by unanimity. Basically,  the European Union is a system of consens. See Martin Seidel. „Die 
Einstimmigkeit im EU-Rat – eine leidige, aber nicht dispensable Regel“ in EuZW, Europäische Zeitschrift für 
Wirtschaftsrecht 3/2000, p. 1 also Martin Seidel „Between Unanimity and Majority: Towards New Rules of 
Decision-Making“ in Norbert Siebert (ed..) „Quo vadis Europe?, Tübingen, 1997, p. 47 ff.:  
 
        “In the fields of the common foreign and security policy and of cooperation in legal and 
domestic policy matters the Member States are required to take decisions in the form of common 
measures and actions by way of unanimity, as a matter of principle. Unanimity has been 
replaced by qualified majority only in respect of implementing measures, which - like decisions 
an principle - do not have any legally binding effect. It has been fully guaranteed that the 
consensus principle would apply without restriction should tasks falling into these two fields be 
assigned to the European Community or should agreements binding under international Iaw be 
concluded. 
 
In light of such a broadly based applicability of the principle of unanimity, the cases in which 
the council adopts decisions by qualified majority - although big in number - are rather modest. 
It opuld be fair to say that, in general, such cases rather are of minor importance insofar as 
Member-State "vital" interests are concerned. Foreign trade  and agriculture represent major 
exceptions from this rule; an even more important exception is budgetary law. 
Decision-making by qualified majority is a principle generally practised by associations of 
people and within states. Applicable to the community of nations and in international law is 
decision-making not by qualified majority, but by consensus and by cooperation. Organisations 
set up under international law, which set legally binding rules and, in doing so, replace the 
consensus principle by other decision-making procedures exempt outvoted or dissenting 
countries from the effects of the decisions so made, as a rule. 
 
The European Communities have been established by treaties binding under international law, 
although these treaties are so-called integration treaties. These Communities are, by their nature, 
either associations of states or confederations; their authority is constituted and legitimised by 
the Member States acting together, but not by any independent sovereign, e.g. a European 
people or the European electorate. Irrespective of certain supranational elements, the 
democratic legitimacy of the Cornmunities' authority is – at  least for the time being - rooted 
exclusively in the peoples of the Member States. The structure of the European Communities and the way in 
which their exercise of powers is legitimised theref re sets conceptual and material lirnits to qualified-
majority decision-making by the council. 
 
Decision-making by qualified majority either by associations of private individuals or by states is subject to 
limits as well, i. ee limits set by the people or by the parliament as the sovereign representation of the people. 
Majority decision-making derives its internal justification, acceptability and legitimacy from the principle that 
the interests reflecting the will of a majority of people may be changed at least in the future, as a matter of 
principle. Majority decision imply the possibility to influence  the majority will  so that decisions, once made, 
can bo modified again. Where interest structures stand to be unchanged, the necessary consenus that the 
sovereign powers assigned to the state or association can be exercised by majority is, as a rule, not obtainable. In 
such cases, democratic decision-making is by concordance rather than competition. 
 
Democracy means government by the people and the exercise of sovereign powers by the people legitimised 
through periodically held elections and through voting; the legitirnacy of decision-making  by concordance 
within a dernocratically organised body is not less democratic than decision-rnaking by simple or qualified 
majority. 
It may be doubted  whether decision-makiang by majority as the general rule, which the Intergovernmental  
Conference 1996 has been invited to agree upon, would ultimately represent an important step towards 
consolidating the integration process. What is hitherto known about the academic theory of the „optimum 
majority rule" does not allow this assumption, but rather confirns the view that decision-making by unanimitity 
ought to be retained. According to the theory developed presumably in the USA, the „optimum decision-
making rule" must be deemed to represent a procedure that minimises the total costs of decision-maling. The   23
                                                                                                                                                         
so-called total costs are composed of the costs due to the inability to reach decisions and the external costs of 
„easier" decision-making procedures disregarding minority interests. Such externals costs are zero where 
decisions are reached by unanimity, they rise the closer the decision-making rule gets to 50 %. Where decision-
makiug is by unanimity, there is an incentive to show a strategic behaviour in an attempt to obtain additional 
advantages by threatening to veto a decision. However, it should not be overlooked that, to a certain extent, 
every decision-making rule is exposed to the threat of „blackmail" by individuals or to the threat of opposition 
by a number of participants which leads to extra negotiating costs. 
The theoretical knowledge about the optimum decision-making rule, which consists, inter alia, of the number 
of winning and losing coalitions and which suggests the largest number of winning coalitions to exist with 
just over 50 % and the lowest costs of the inability to reach deeisions at 51 %,  are based on the basic 
assumption that all conceivable coalitions are of the same possibility and that consequently, the existence of 
stable coalitions of participants cannot be proved.  lt is further assumed that all participants are willing to 
share in the decision-making efforts. However, these two basic assumptions have not been met insofar as 
the European Union is concerned: 
Within the European Community, the Member-State interests are unchangeable, by and large. Besides the 
prosperous Member States there are less prosperous ones whose interests in the transfer of resources are 
different, of necessity. There are Member States which, because of their better economic performance and 
greater cornpetitiveness, pursue, when it comes to integrating their economy into a global free-trade system, 
interests that are different from those  of the Member States that are less well off. Any dominant economy like 
the German neatly integrated into a world-spanning system of free trade is, since it is one of several members 
of a community of nations, bound to have interests that are different from those Member States whose 
economies show a different orientation. Gerrnany's European policy is aimed to an open trade policy of the 
European Community; since trade-policy decision-makining requires a qualified rnajority, it is the aim of 
German European policy to ensure the existance of a blocking minority, no matter what the price rnay be, to 
fend off protectionist trends in the European Community's trade policy. Member States, instead of vetoing a 
decision by reference to vital national interests, make attempts at forming minority  or blocking coalitions to 
ensure that their interests are duly taken account of within the framework if the overall squaring of interests under 
a rnajority decision-making regime. The disintegrative effects of decisions reached by qualified majority have 
been denonstrated by tlie loss of acceptability in connection with the banana market regulation. 
As a result of unchangeable Member-State interest structures, it would be fair to assume that  firm coalitions 
exist in all those areas in which the principle of unanimity is still applicable - the less prosperous Member 
States' continuing interest in transfers of ftnancial and other resources at the expense of the more prosperous 
Member States, and they are less free-trade-minded so that they wish the European Union  to be less free-trade 
minded as well,  which would be to the detriment of ce more strongly in the benefit of intervention in opposition 
to the credo of the free rnarketeers. Firm coalitions have emerged in environmental protection among the 
Member States with a less strongly developed awareness for environmental needs. Their attitude is opposed to 
the interests of these convinced that the acceptability of market economy and its liberal constitution is at stake in 
the absence of national and/or Connmunity policies for protecting the environement. Lasting coalitions of 
countries exist where the interests of certain countries in a stronger orientation of the European Union to the 
Mediterranean countries must be offset against the interests of certain other countries that want the European 
Union show a greater understanding for certain countries in central and eastern Europe, in the ficld of economic 
and monetary union, Member-State coalitions must be deemed to exist insofar as the interests of countries with 
less stable money must be opposed to the interests of the couitries with greater monetary stability. There is, no 
least, an interest of certain Member States wishing their national languages classified as languages used by the 
European Union as a matter of priority. On the other hand, there is the interest of an unchanged group of 
Member States insisting an their national languages to be classified as official Community languages that are of .no 
less importance. 
The view that the coalition of France and Germany and the coalition of the Mediterranean countries has hitherto 
not had a determing influence on the decision-making processes within the European Community has not beein 
substantiated by research. Broader empirical studies which would have to include the submission of proposals by 
the Commission and, most important of all, the voting behaviour in the committees - which are not free from being 
influenced by the Member States - may be anticipated to Iead to opposite results. It is no coincidence that   24
                                                                                                                                                         
Mernber States visibly strive for a common denominator and ultimately a consensus even in areas in which 
majority-decision-making is possible. 
It is not possible to estimate the costs of the European Union`s instability to reach decoisions, they can, at 
best, be deplored. The „external" costs of decision-making in the course of which the interests of outvoted 
Member States are not taken account of are likely to be of indefinite dimensions in rnany fields, this applies to 
those cases in which a „withdrawal" or „non-participation" is dernanded or discussed because interests have 
not been taken into account. 
 
In its 12 October 1993 ruling, Germany's Federal Constitutional Court indicated constitutional-law limits to 
decision-making by qualified majority. In areas in  which Gerrnany's „vital interests are affected it is not 
possible in the Court's opinion to legitimise decisions of the Council that have been adopted against the will of 
Germany by a qualified majority in a suffciently democratic way. The question has remained open whether 
this interpretation of Germany`s Basic Law - the German Constitution - means a lmitation of majority decisions 
throuht out or whether this limitation is of relevance only where Germany has been outvoted in
 the Council 
and where Germany's vital interests are at stake. For the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference the ruling of the 
Federal Constitutional Court means in any event that decision-making by unanimity which is necessary if the 
Protocol on the convergence criteria is to be modified cannot be replaced by decision-making by qualified 
rnajority. The Federal Constitutional Court has justified the acceptability of the rules and regulations of an 
European Economic and Monetary Union essentially by the view that according to Article 6 of the ”Protocol 
on the Convergence Criteria" the „Council shall adopt appropriate provisions to lay down the details of 
the convergence criteria referred to in Article 109 j" by unanimity. Likewise, the ruling bans the transition to 
decision-rnaking by qualified majority in respect of all those decisions and legal acts the Council takes pursuant 
to paragraph 4 of Article 109 1 of the EC Treaty after the entry to the final stake of Economic and Monetary Urion. This 
applies to the irrevocable fixation of the exchange rates which may be associated with monetary losses and/or gains for 
Member States. lt holds true also for all those legal acts that are needed in connection with the introduction of 
the European currency. 
 
lt has not yet been decided whether the constitutional law limits the Federal Constitutional Court has derived 
fom the Basic Law are applicable to all those areas in which decision-making by consensus is still valid for 
the time being. If appropriate, Germany would only be in a position to agree to decision-making by qualified 
majority if the reservations concerning applicability pursuant to the German constitution continue to be 
applicable in case Germany is outvoted.” 
 
  
viii See Article 189 EC Treaty 
 
ix  Any such transformation of the European Union would have to start with the European Parliament. A 
prerequisite for the transfer of more extensive powers to the European Community is not solely their assignment 
to the European Parliament, but first its restructuring into a genuine representation of the Community electorate. 
There is, of course, no European "nation" from which "Community sovereignty" could be held to derive, as with 
the nation within a state. Even the substantial integrating impact of the Community in social-political terms will 
not lead to the emergence of a "European nation" for a long time yet. The peoples of the European Community 
have lived within the constitutional framework of nation states for too long and developed traditions that differ 
too widely. Their systems of communications and education are still too steeped in national attitudes. Equality in 
terms of voting may result in smaller countries being denied any influence on the political decision-making 
process. A parliament, however, is not so much concerned with the influence of smaller or larger states but with 
the influence of social trends and movements. If a Member State was too small and its citizens therefore found 
themselves completely excluded from playing a part in the exercise of common sovereignty, the principle of 
protecting minorities would justify giving them some special position. The only option to ensure that every 
country has a fair chance to influence Community legislation and policy would be to establish a second 
legislative chamber. In the European Union this could be the Council, with appropriate arrangements made to 
ensure that the smaller Member States could properly defend their interests. The parliament representing the 
"community of citizens" must not be burdened with the additional function of ensuring that each individual 
Member State has a fair share of influence on its decisions. 
 
x See Martin Seidel,. „Das Kompetenz- und Entscheidungssystem des Vertrages von Rom im Wandel    25
                                                                                                                                                         
seiner  Funktion und Verfassung“ in Jürgen Bröhmer, Roland Bieber, Christian Callies, Christine Langenfeld, 
Stefan Weber und Joachim Wolf (Hrsg) „Internationale Gemeinschaft und Menschenrechte“,  Festschrift für 
Georg Ress zum 70.Geburtstag, Berlin, 2005, S. 805 ff 
 
xi The societal and political preconditions and the basic readiness of the Member States who had to surrender 
national sovereignty even for a partial conversion of the European Union from aconfederation into a federation 
by means of  European Referenda of the dicussed federal type may not be granted. Nontheless the idealistic 
planning of European Referenda should not be totally set aside or even banned by constitutional scepticime or 
experiences with the difficult process of European Integration dring the past decade. If the European Union 
would try to introduce it at least succede in making the necessary constitutionl structure for a federal typed 
“United Europe” more visible more familiar and less dangerous as it seems to be regarded, a substantial 
breakthrough of the process of European Interagtiion would have happened. 2008
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